Inside Iran's Secret Military Procurement Network

The sophisticated apparatus, identified through leaked Bank Sepah documents and shipping data, serves as the primary procurement backbone for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. By utilizing frontmen and shell companies, these agencies—all claiming a 1979 founding date—have moved massive quantities of dual-use goods, including rocket propellant ingredients from China and Russian-made detonators. Financial tracking reveals that 97 percent of these transactions were settled without currency transfers, effectively shielding the network from standard international banking alerts.

At the center of this web, the entity known as MOD 346428 emerged as a major importer, facilitating the delivery of rocket precursors and heavy-duty vehicles, including Iveco trucks repurposed as mobile missile launchers. The scale of this operation was underscored by a deadly explosion at the Port of Shahid Rajaee in April 2025, which destroyed a shipment of sodium perchlorate tied to the network. While the US Treasury maintains that its sanctions remain effective, former officials describe the system as a resilient, complete ecosystem that has sustained the Iranian military's supply chain through the current conflict. China, identified as a key source for materials like titanium and chemical precursors, has denied involvement in the procurement scheme.