Antalya Tests the 1992 Divide Over Who Pays for Climate Action

The divide was built into the climate and biodiversity conventions adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Under the climate treaty, Annex I identifies industrialised countries expected to lead emissions cuts, while Annex II names those required to provide finance. The biodiversity convention has a separate donor list, last reviewed in 2006, that includes mostly European countries as well as Japan, Australia and Canada.

The lists have changed little even as economies have shifted. China is now the world’s largest emitter and second-largest economy, and Gulf states hold some of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, yet neither has a formal obligation to pay under either treaty. Developing countries counter that historical responsibility and per-capita emissions remain unequal, and that established donors have repeatedly missed finance targets. The categories themselves, rather than any settled resolution of that dispute, are increasingly contested.

At COP29 in Baku in 2024, countries agreed to keep developed nations in the lead on climate finance while encouraging developing countries to contribute voluntarily. The decision also said it did not affect any party’s development or recipient status. China presented its overseas finance as climate finance for the first time at Baku, on terms it defined.

A similar compromise emerged at the UN biodiversity summit in Yerevan on 31 October. The European Union pushed to expand the donor list to include China and Gulf states, but Saudi Arabia and Qatar opposed broadening it. India, Brazil and China were also among those resisting, while developing countries argued established donors should first meet existing commitments. The final agreement invites countries willing to assume developed-country obligations to signal interest before the next summit and at every second summit thereafter. No country will be added without its consent, and voluntary contributions do not imply inclusion. The EU called the result timid.

That approach lets emerging economies contribute and receive diplomatic credit without taking on formal obligations or giving up eligibility for support. China’s contributions through channels it controls, including the Kunming Biodiversity Fund, bring visibility and influence while avoiding the accounting, reporting and scrutiny attached to formal donor status. Its developing-country standing also underpins its role in the G77-plus-China format and its claim to speak for the Global South.

Türkiye’s dispute runs in the opposite direction. It entered Annex I in 1992 because of its OECD membership, then secured removal from Annex II in 2001. In 2021, it won recognition as the only developing country within Annex I, enabling it to ratify the Paris Agreement. It remains on the developed-country list and is therefore ineligible for Green Climate Fund finance.

Ankara has repeatedly sought a change. During the contest with Australia to host COP31, Carbon Pulse reported that Türkiye was at one point willing to withdraw its bid in exchange for removal from Annex I, with Australia understood to be offering diplomatic support. Such a change would require a formal amendment to the Convention and likely consensus among all parties. Türkiye’s direct stake complicates its role as COP president and broker on finance and differentiation, even if its status is not formally discussed.

Finance will be a central fault line in Antalya. The African Group wants dedicated agenda space on tripling adaptation finance and on the Green Climate Fund. Meanwhile, the UN’s latest synthesis of national climate plans projects 2035 emissions at about 6% below 2019 levels—half the reduction projected a year earlier—partly because the United States’ pledge dropped out after its exit from the Paris Agreement.

The presidency also embodies the competing interests: Türkiye leads the summit, while Australia serves as President of Negotiations and is both a biodiversity donor and a long-standing climate finance provider. The negotiations will show whether finance texts lean toward voluntary contributions or reaffirm obligations on developed countries alone, whether developing-country positions remain aligned, and whether any process on Türkiye’s status gains support.

A formal change to Annex I is unlikely at Antalya. But the broader pattern is already visible: contributions expand through voluntary channels while official categories remain fixed. The risk, the analysis argues, is that finance increasingly follows contributors’ own terms and definitions rather than shared rules. The question for COP31 is whether the 1992 divide can be replaced with a coherent system or will instead erode through exceptions.