The Saudi Nuclear Deal and the Erosion of Global Non-Proliferation

The 123 agreement, which commits Riyadh to utilizing Westinghouse technology, allows for domestic uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. By bypassing the IAEA’s Additional Protocol—a cornerstone of international oversight—Washington has opted for a verification framework governed by private bilateral arrangements rather than independent global monitors. This move required a specific national security waiver from the president, a clear admission that the arrangement operates outside the traditional non-proliferation architecture established since 1970.

This policy pivot arrives at a precarious moment. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weaponry should Iran acquire such capabilities. While the deal aims to provide energy independence through U.S.-controlled infrastructure, the precedent it sets is profound. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan now possess a compelling argument to demand comparable terms. By lowering the bar for nuclear cooperation, the United States has arguably accelerated the regional arms race, betting that direct influence over the Saudi program will suffice where multilateral norms have failed. With a 90-day congressional review period underway, the agreement faces significant bipartisan scrutiny, though overturning the pact would require a two-thirds majority, a threshold never before met in the history of the statute.