Great Power Competition Shifts the Sahel’s Security Architecture

The Kremlin’s strategy relies on providing direct military support, including weapons and Africa Corps personnel, to regimes isolated from Western partners. While this secures high-level political access, the operational reality remains grim. In April, a coordinated offensive by al-Qaeda-linked militants and Tuareg separatists killed Mali’s defense minister, Sadio Camara, and forced Russian forces to retreat from Kidal—a site they had captured only years prior to cement their influence.

Beijing, meanwhile, avoids the immediate volatility of the battlefield by focusing on long-term extraction and development. In Niger, state-owned CNPC has funneled over $5 billion into oil infrastructure, including a 1,950-kilometre pipeline to the coast. In Mali, the Ganfeng Lithium project at Goulamina highlights a broader trend: Chinese firms are absorbing mining assets as Western operators exit. While Moscow provides the urgent, albeit fragile, security that keeps these juntas in power, China’s economic footprint is becoming structurally embedded in the regional economy.

This divergence creates a distinct geopolitical gamble. Moscow’s influence is tethered to the survival of the current military governments; should the security situation collapse further, Russia faces the same existential criticism that eventually drove France out. China, conversely, maintains a position that is less contingent on winning the war against insurgents. By prioritizing infrastructure over combat, Beijing is positioning itself to remain relevant regardless of which political faction holds power, making its presence considerably more difficult to displace than the Russian security model.