The difficulty lies in the distinction between monitoring a ceasefire and enforcing a transition. Resolution 2803 tasks the ISF with the destruction of military infrastructure and the disarmament of non-state groups, a mission that far exceeds traditional peacekeeping. Potential contributors, such as Indonesia, have initially offered support only to retreat when faced with the reality of combatant roles and uncertain implementation guidelines. Jakarta’s pivot from a potential 8,000-troop commitment to an indefinite hold highlights the gap between regional political support and actual security participation.
This hesitation is particularly acute among Arab nations. While states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt endorse the transition, they avoid direct military involvement to prevent being caught between Israeli forces and Palestinian factions. Participation carries the risk of being perceived as enforcers of an external settlement, a political liability few are willing to accept. Consequently, the force currently relies on smaller, specialized contributions from nations like Albania, Kosovo, and Morocco, which offer demining and command expertise but lack the scale to secure the entire territory.
Ultimately, the ISF is trapped in a circular dilemma: it requires a stable political roadmap to justify deployment, yet that very roadmap depends on an armed presence to provide security for its implementation. Until the sequencing of Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian demilitarization is finalized, governments will likely continue to view the mission as too politically perilous to join. The final composition of the ISF will serve as a barometer for the international community's confidence in the peace plan itself.
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