The Return of Great-Power Spheres of Influence

In the Western Hemisphere, the United States has revived the 1823 Monroe Doctrine under President Trump. The January 2026 invasion of Venezuela, justified by migration concerns and the desire to re-privatize the nationalized oil sector, signals a shift toward unilateral hardline intervention. Similar rhetoric now targets Cuba, Colombia, and Mexico, while the administration has weighed annexing Greenland to anchor the 'Golden Dome' defense system against Russian expansion in the Arctic.

Russia, meanwhile, continues its push to consolidate a sphere of influence across Eastern Europe. Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has extended its reach through persistent cyberattacks, drone surveillance, and sabotage of underwater cables targeting Baltic and Nordic states. This strategy relies on the tacit complicity of other powers; notably, the U.S. has signaled a potential withdrawal of military aid to Ukraine, effectively softening its resistance to Kremlin territorial demands.

China is concurrently asserting its dominance in Asia, specifically through its 'One China' policy regarding Taiwan. Military pressure on the island has intensified since 2016, a trend exacerbated by President Trump’s April 2026 suggestion that arms exports to Taipei could be negotiable. Beyond the Taiwan Strait, Beijing continues to enforce its 'nine-dash line' claims in the South China Sea, constructing militarized artificial islands and challenging the territorial waters of the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. As these powers prioritize their regional hegemony, the framework of international law is increasingly sidelined in favor of a new, volatile era of imperial competition.